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The Cycle of Violence
Margaret Urban Walker
Department of Philosophy, Arizona State University
Tempe, AZ
“We see the cycle of hatred at work at every level of
violence. It is a factor in intergroup violence. It stokes
bias crimes. Perpetrators of domestic violence and
sexual abuse were often victims themselves, who
experienced as children the dehumanization they inflict
in turn. Crimes of hate have a past; sadly, they have a
future, too, as each contributes to the climate of
demonization and the desire for revenge. Perpetrators
become victims, victims avengers. The cycle extends
across generations. It can appear to be almost a force of
nature. There is a seemingly implacable logic to anger
and vengeance that is barely interrupted by revulsion at
violent death, by attempts at forgiveness, or by sheer
exhaustion.”
Nancy Rosenblum, “Introduction” to Memory,
Law, and Repair1
Cycles of violence are a reality in some situations and a threat in
others. The “cycle of violence” (or of hatred, or vengeance) is also a powerful
image invoked frequently in talking about the possible consequences of
serious, especially violent, wrongdoing. It is a charged and frightening image
but also an entirely familiar one that is a convention of popular entertainment
from ancient tragedy to American Westerns, and to contemporary films like
“In the Bedroom,” and “Mystic River.” It also emerges commonly as a
looming threat in discussions of wrongdoing, resentment, vengeance,
forgiveness, and reconciliation: wrongdoing begets resentment, rage, or
hatred; feelings drive violent reprisal; reprisal in turn begets

retaliation; and so on, driving the inexorable “cycle.” Conciliatory
approaches to wrongdoing look desirable by comparison to the horrible
prospect of retaliatory violence cycling out of control. It is because this
can indeed happen that the threat must be taken seriously.
Many discussions of child abuse, domestic battery, and school or
gang violence use the idea of a cycle of violence.2 My primary concern,
however, is the recurrence of this idea in contexts of political violence,
where the cycle in question is one of successive rounds of retaliation
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between two parties. I do not wish to deny the reality or the threat of
cyclical violence in many actual situations, but I want to examine
problematic and disturbing features of the use of the image of “the
cycle of violence” in social and political connections. I believe that this
image is misleading in suggesting that retaliatory violence - and so a
self-propelling cycle or spiral of vengeance - is the natural or
predictable outcome of serious or violent wrongdoing. I believe that
this picture rests on a number of presuppositions about people’s
responses to wrongful injury, including assumptions about what people
are likely to feel when wronged, which feelings are likely to dominate
their responses, and what those feelings are likely to spur them to
seek and do. Some of these presuppositions do not seem descriptively
accurate; they seem to overgeneralize or to neglect the significance of
social and political context, as well as differences in moral and political
conviction and personality, among individuals.
Research and experience with restorative justice practice, for
example, suggests that wrongfully harmed individuals are often willing
to entertain forms of amends and satisfaction that are not violently
retaliatory, and not always punitive, in nature. The upsurge of interest
in reparations for mass violence or oppression also suggests the varied
forms of satisfaction victims of injustice may seek, as well as deep
differences in what those wronged will find acceptable as a response.
Richer philosophical and practical understanding of negative reactive
emotions like resentment and indignation, along with the study of
victims’ reactions and responses in actual cases, reveals that those
offended or injured may, individually or collectively, value explanation,
reassurance, validation, apology, and amends from wrongdoers and
communities, rather than seeking to inflict damage on perpetrators in
retaliation.
In addition to questionable assumptions about individual
reactions, the presumed psychology of angry reprisal obscures the
mediating roles of social and political environments in determining
whether people receive instruction and incentive to engage in vengeful
rather than peacemaking responses. People will seek satisfaction and
vindication when they are wronged, or they will do so at least if they
are not crushed into submission or paralyzed by terror. Yet what forms
of satisfaction or vindication injured parties or successors will see as
available and meaningful are significantly affected by the social and
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political environment into which wrongdoing intrudes, or by the social
and political climate that comes into being under the impact of
oppression or political violence.3 Furthermore, assuming that
retaliatory behavior is the default reaction to injustice or violence may
also have the distorting effect of introducing a fictive moral
equivalence between victims and perpetrators of violence or injustice
in actual cases, implying that victims should be seen as capable of
violence and ready to use violence or unjust measures to settle scores.
The same assumption might in turn fortify a common and repugnant
form of offender or oppressor denial based on the idea that those
harmed want to get even, would like to repay their violators with
something like the violence inflicted on them, and are waiting for their
opportunity to turn the tables. In other words, they, the victims, are
no better than we, the offenders, are in their willingness to act
violently or inhumanely.
Finally, the rhetoric of cycles of violence may have the power by
means of its questionable presumptions to shift an unfair burden onto
victims. To victims, it seems, falls the opportunity and the necessity of
“stopping the cycle of violence” by adopting conciliatory rather than
punitive, retributive, or unpleasantly demanding measures. One does
not need to deny the importance of the possibility of igniting cycles of
violence to see that those who have been wronged should not be faced
with the dilemma: conciliation or spiraling violence, as if this were
their only choice and solely their responsibility. This shifts to victims a
burden of responsibility that is manifestly unfair if the assumptions
underlying the “naturalness” of cyclical violence are questionable.
Since one feature of serious wrongdoing is that victims incur “costs” material, psychological, and moral - that can never be completely
repaid by perpetrators or others (no wrong is ever truly undone), it is
especially unjust to pressure victims to take a less demanding path
than one that might get them some measures of redress and
satisfaction.
My point, then, is not to deny that there are cycles of violence.
Nor am I arguing against the importance of retributive justice as one
clear and indispensable form of vindication for victims and of the
communal reiteration of standards. I want instead to make sure that
the space is preserved in which we can ask questions about how cycles
of violence are stoked or avoided, and what alternative responses,
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retributive and non-retributive, satisfy victims’ needs for and rights to
acknowledgment and vindication. My concern is that this space not be
diminished or closed up by assumptions of the naturalness or
inevitability of retaliatory violence, or the necessity or sufficiency of
retribution as its surrogate. These assumptions can limit our view of
what kinds of interventions are possible and necessary. I begin with a
lurid, moving, frightening, and exciting story that activates the image
of the cycle of violence in which the victim attempts revenge on
someone who terribly and violently harmed her. I use this as an
opening to ask what we think we see in the drama of vengeance, and
what is less likely to attract our attention. This might help us to
understand why we are so inclined to think that meeting violence with
violence is the natural sequence, and that retaliation in kind has its
own inexorable logic.

I. Death and the Maiden
A woman is at home in an isolated house by the sea. It is night,
and she sits on the terrace. When a car turns in toward the house, the
woman gets a gun. When she hears her husband’s voice, she puts the
gun away - until later. This is the opening of Ariel Dorfman’s play
about Paulina Salas, an imagined survivor of political violence by the
former military government of her Latin American country. Under that
regime she was kidnapped, secretly detained, repeatedly raped, and
otherwise tortured.4 Paulina’s husband Gerardo Escobar is a
distinguished lawyer; Paulina surmises correctly that her husband has
agreed to head a truth commission that will investigate those - and
only those - human rights violations that ended in death; those that
are, as the play says “beyond repair.” Because Paulina survived her
torture, her story will not be heard and her case will not be
investigated.
Gerardo, who had a flat tire on the highway returning home in a
rainstorm, invites the stranger who drove him home to stay the night.
Paulina believes this “good Samaritan” is the physician who presided
over her torture and who raped her when she was kidnapped and held
in detention by the state. Paulina believes she recognizes his voice and
phrases, and when she gets closer, his scent. While Gerardo sleeps,
Paulina takes Dr. Roberto Miranda captive, knocks him unconscious,
binds him to a chair, mocks and humiliates him with sexual taunts,
and proceeds to interrogate and terrorize him with threats of death if
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he does not confess. Gerardo is horrified and terrified when he awakes
to find Paulina holding Miranda at gunpoint. He cajoles, pleads, and
remonstrates with her that her behavior is “crazy,” but she is not
moved. In the middle of the play, Paulina tells Gerardo “what she
wants.” She begins with the thought of doing to Miranda, in exact
detail, everything that was done to her; she says that she wants to
have him raped. But she concludes that what she really wants is for
him to confess, in his own handwriting with his own signature, to
everything he has done, so that she could keep the copy for her own
protection and satisfaction. When Gerardo reminds her she might be
making a mistaken identification, and so might be holding and
tormenting an innocent man, Paulina replies at the end of the scene,
“If he’s innocent? Then he’s really screwed.”5
Gerardo tries to conspire with Miranda to produce a plausible
enough confession to win his freedom; he feeds Roberto details of
Paulina’s torture that he has wrested from her for this purpose. But
Paulina is one step ahead. She has fed Gerardo small inaccuracies in
order to see if Miranda will correct them; he does, and thus reveals
himself as in fact her torturer. The penultimate scene ends in
ambiguity, with an increasingly agitated Paulina threatening to kill an
unrepentant and evasive Roberto. In a concluding scene Paulina and
Gerardo are attending a concert of Shubert’s Death and the Maiden
when Roberto appears to enter the theater. The Commission has done
its work. For the first time, Paulina is again able to listen to Shubert’s
piece, her favorite, that Dr. Miranda had played while he raped her. It
is unclear whether Roberto is real or is an apparition of Paulina’s. She
turns to look at him, then turns back to face the stage.
Paulina Salas is a fiction, but her experience of violation and its
political context is not. Dorfman, a Chilean citizen in exile during
Pinochet’s rule, knows the facts of Pinochet’s brutal regime and the
voices of its victims. Investigations of Pinochet’s rule by Chile’s
National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation and its successor
Reparation and Reconciliation Corporation found 3,197 cases of
disappearance leading to extrajudicial execution or deaths under
torture.6 Like the commission in Dorfman’s play, the Commission on
Truth and Reconciliation was charged to investigate and document
only the cases of victims who were killed or are presumed dead. So
like the imagined Paulina Salas, the real surviving victims of torture in
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Pinochet’s Chile had no opportunity to testify about their violation or to
have their cases investigated, and numbers of those surviving torture
were uncertain. The Chilean government recently commissioned a new
investigation, and a report issued in 2004 reflected, at last, testimony
of 35,000 torture survivors.7
Since opening in Chile in 1991, Death and the Maiden has been
performed in at least thirty countries in many productions; it has been
made into a major motion picture starring Sigourney Weaver and Ben
Kingsley.8 The play is morally disturbing and dramatically gripping. But
what does the play depict as the reaction and reality of the victim?
Dorfman’s Paulina is unstable, wounded, crazed, and vengeful, and it
is her aggressive, threatening, and violent acts that drive the story.
She has been confined, tormented, and violated; she in turn confines,
torments, and violates her torturer, threatening him with death and
shrugging off the possibility that he is an innocent man wrongly under
suspicion. Paulina enacts the cycle of violence in its precise form; she
not only needs and desires to inflict in return what she suffered at the
hands of Dr. Miranda, but she seizes the first opportunity to act out
her vengeful desires with startling ferocity. The scenario of Death and
the Maiden embodies, up to a point, a stock plot and a popular genre:
righteous retaliation turned on wrongdoers. “From the ancient Greeks
to the evening news, every age has been transfixed by the spectacle of
people driven to exact blood for blood,” says Jeremiah Creedon.9 Does
this familiar and mesmerizing plot and favored motif of journalism
capture some truth about the ways violence begets violence, and what
victims need and want?
Dorfman has said of the victims, “I am not their voice: I make a
space for those voices, a bridge.”10 Some people who have suffered
detention and torture like Paulina’s, however, do not see the reality of
“the victim” or hear her voice in Dorfman’s play. Poet and human
rights activist Alicia Partnoy, author of The Little School, stories based
on months of secret detention and torture in Argentina in the 1970s,
objects to the “thriller’s devices” in Dorfman’s play by which the victim
of political torture becomes “a victimizer and a mad woman.” “[W]e
hear a victim that is out of her mind and committing an act of violence
totally out of context... Where is the acknowledgment to the stories
and lives of all the women who did not need to resort to a gun and did
not appear as - however justifiable - crazy as Paulina[?]”11 Partnoy
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also notes the presence of disturbingly titillating details: Paulina, who
has been raped and sexually tortured, is portrayed in both the play
and the film versions as gagging Roberto by removing her underpants
and stuffing them in Roberto’s mouth. Ana Roca, in an essay on the
movie Death and the Maiden, observes as well that “the film
manipulates viewers’ allegiances, making us doubt the victim herself
to make the evening’s entertainment more suspenseful and exciting.”12
No doubt Death and the Maiden is performed widely because its
dramatic excitement draws attention to political realities from which
people otherwise would rather turn away. Yet the depiction of the
victim of disappearance and torture in the play and the film follows too
well a stylized generic formula: the victim wants “payback,” and that
means visiting on the offender equivalent violence or suffering, or
vengeance compounded with interest.
This tried and “true” - not to mention exciting - formula
threatens to overwhelm the other important details that are worked
into Dorfman’s drama. Paulina’s racing for a gun at the sound of a car
reveals terror, not rage. Paulina has just learned that her “case” will
not be investigated and her story will not be told as part of the official
truth the new commission seeks. Paulina is suspended between the
power Gerardo believes inheres in the legal system’s standards of
proof and due process, a system that remains powerless to deliver
justice to her, and the power to demand some satisfaction that Paulina
has learned belongs to the person with the gun. Once Roberto is
captive, Paulina first makes him listen to her story, before she insists
on exacting a confession from him. Paulina recites a litany of violent
reprisals that she has, to her own horror, imagined turning back on
Roberto. Yet, in the end it is Roberto’s accountability, in a full and
signed confession that admits everything he has done and so the
confirms everything she and others have suffered and endured, that
Paulina ultimately seeks. In the final moments of the penultimate
scene, Paulina asks only for Roberto’s repentance as the price to spare
his life; and she asks why it is always “people like me” - victims of
violence - who are forced to make concessions in seeking a resolution
to an episode or era of violence.13
Paulina’s needs for validation, voice, and vindication go
unanswered. The character of Paulina is not only a victim of horrible
violence; she is a victim who is abandoned and isolated. Dorfman’s
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play troubles us with the tension between a fantasy of vengeance that
is dramatically exciting and the reality of victims who deserve and
need some kind of justice in a world that typically offers them little or
none. If Paulina is driven to a crazed vengeful rage, is this solely
because of the terrible violence done to her by Roberto and others? Or
is it also because, given that brutal, terrorizing, and humiliating
violence, no other way has been available to reclaim her equilibrium,
her safety, her dignity, and the recognition of her loss, pain, and
blamelessness? Would Paulina be driven to act out that rage violently
if there were other ways to claim what she needs, if her membership
in a community entitled her to make these claims, and if it assured her
that she would be respected and supported in pursuing them? There is
no simple answer here, for there is no one thing victims of serious
wrongdoing feel and want. Yet there is suggestive evidence that many
victims face similar terrors, affronts, threats, and losses, and that
victims are deeply sensitive to the ways provided or denied them in
coming to terms with the wrongful harm others have done them.

II. What do victims seek? Restorative Justice &
Responses to Crime and Political Violence
“In contrast to revenge, which is the natural, automatic
reaction to transgression and which because of the
irreversibility of the action process can be expected and
even calculated, the act of forgiving can never be
predicted...”14
“If one person or group has wronged another, it is
common for the victim, the injured party, to feel rage
and resentment, leading to a desire to ‘get one’s own
back,’ or ‘get even.’ ”15
“Vengeance can thus set in motion a downward spiral of
violence, or an unquenchable desire that traps people in
cycles of revenge, recrimination, and escalation.”16
“The victim then becomes the active perpetrator, often
enjoying some of the destructiveness of the hatred. A
cycle of retaliatory violence is set in motion. The victims
and their friends take the shame and humiliation they
have endured and turn it back on their ‘prey.’ ”17

The image of the cycle of violence or vengeance implies that
victims are strongly and perhaps naturally inclined to seek vengeance
or retaliation in kind. How well grounded is this assumption in detailed
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study of the responses of victims?18 What do we know about what
victims in fact desire and seek? Several literatures give us insight into
common, although by no means universal, patterns of feeling, need,
and desire in those who suffer violence, humiliation, and indignity.
Literatures exploring restorative justice practices, transitional justice
and reparations, and trauma find common concerns and experiences
of victims, while revealing the complexity we should expect in victims’
responses to being wronged and harmed.
Restorative justice is a concept and a movement informing both
alternatives to standard court processing and the “presumption of
prison” for criminal offenders, and alternatives and adjuncts to
criminal tribunals in cases of political violence and oppression.19
Restorative justice embodies a view of crime or violence as a violation
of people and relationships that entails an obligation to set things
right; the emphasis is on acknowledging the needs of victims and
requiring accountability, including truth-telling, apology, and
restitution or compensation, from offenders. In the ordinary criminal
context, restorative justice offers forms of conferencing and
community involvement that allow participation by those most directly
involved in a criminal offense; on the national and international plane,
truth commissions and programs of reparation can be seen as
embodying restorative justice principles. Restorative justice practices
within criminal justice systems in several countries have now provided
the basis for empirical studies. More impressionistic but intriguing
evidence is available from projects of national transitions to peace and
democracy.
John Braithwaite, in his recent book Restorative Justice and
Responsive Regulation, provides a concise overview of numerous
recent empirical studies of perceptions and responses of crime victims
and offenders in several countries to restorative justice programs that
provide alternatives to criminal court proceedings.20 While many
studies involve small samples and self-selection of participants, some
more recent studies involve randomized assignments. To the extent
that findings are comparable, significant convergence appears: victims
with access to restorative programs (of varying design) appear to
achieve greater satisfaction than with conventional criminal justice
procedures by measures victims themselves identify as important,
such as perceived procedural fairness, participation, and material and
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emotional restoration. Braithwaite notes especially the work of Heather
Strang, who overviewed empirical literatures to match what victims in
Canberra, Australia, said they wanted with how well their desires were
realized in either restorative justice or conventional criminal processes
to which they were randomly assigned. In addition to diminishing
feelings of anger, fear, and anxiety towards offenders, and enhancing
feelings of dignity, self-respect, and self-confidence in victims, Strang
found, in Braithwaite’s words, that “more than half of court-assigned
violence victims said they would harm their offender if they had the
chance, compared with only 7 percent of those assigned to restorative
justice.”21 While these results are hardly decisive, they are suggestive
in the context of a larger body of evidence. Almost all victims desire
some forms of resolution and satisfaction, but victims may both be and
feel well-served (“done justice”) by a process that is less punitive or
vindictive but that offers participation, control, and a direct response
from their offender.22
Demands and responses of victims of mass violence and
oppression in national and international contexts also suggests that
victims seek and value forms of acknowledgment, reassurance, and
reparation that are not exclusively or primarily retaliatory or punitive.
Lyle Rexer, covering the gacaca proceedings in Rwanda for the New
York Times, paints a striking picture of Rwandans participating in a
customary system of local tribunals as a way to resolve the situations
of tens of thousands of persons incarcerated for the 1994 genocide of
Tutsi by Hutu in which an estimated 800,000 people died in a few
months. The gacacas, local open-air hearings presided over by elders
and community representatives, allow accusations, confessions, and
defenses to be made and answered, and a communally endorsed
resolution to be achieved. Rexer notes that “as the line of hundreds of
villagers and prisoners snakes through the hills, leaving the trial site,
there is a sense of orderliness despite the presence of only a handful
of armed guards.”23 As they move into full operation, the gacaca
courts continue to be controversial for questions of due process, for
claims that witnesses are not secure from reprisal, for allegations that
significant numbers of elected judges were themselves involved in the
genocide, and for failure to address adequately the rapes estimated to
have victimized as many as 250,000 women.24 Even amid the
controversies, the unfolding of tens thousands of these traditional
adjudications dramatizes how capable of restraint and decorum are
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human beings who have suffered, and whose families and communities
have been ravaged by, almost unimaginable violence. Rwandan
gacacas, like Western-style court proceedings, restorative justice
programs, or other traditional methods of community justice and
peacemaking rely on victims’ willingness to forgo direct retaliation and
to seek resolution through an orderly procedure that may avert, rather
than insure, the chance to pay back the perpetrator in kind.25
Leaders in national transitional movements for “truth and
reconciliation” repeatedly express some wonder at the willingness of
many victims and survivors of extreme violence and oppression to be
moderate in their responses and demands. Jose Zalaquett, a member
of Chile’s influential National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation,
reported after interviewing thousands of relatives of people killed or
disappeared under the Pinochet regime, “Certainly, many of them
asked for justice. Hardly anyone, however, showed a desire for
vengeance. Most of them stressed that in the end, what really
mattered to them was to know the truth, that the memory of their
loved ones would not be denigrated or forgotten, and that such terrible
things would never happen again.”26 South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission provoked legal challenges, ultimately
unsuccessful, to its right to grant amnesty in return for full disclosure
to those responsible for murders. No doubt, many South Africans
wanted retributive justice for killers and torturers. Yet both those
people and many others who accepted and participated in the
Commission’s proceeding were actors in a peaceful political transition
that avoided a “bloodbath,” in the term very commonly used, that
many people thought inevitable just some years earlier. Participants in
the TRC process that was a centerpiece of that peaceful transition echo
Zalaquett’s remarks of some years earlier. Ellis Cose quotes deputy
Chairperson of the TRC Alex Boraine who speaks of “the generosity of
spirit of so many people who have been hurt so badly.”27 James
Gibson’s recent impressive survey study of the aftermath of the TRC,
found that while individual amnesty for truth is very widely perceived
as unfair for terrible crimes, perceptions of unfairness are mitigated
when other forms of justice - compensatory, procedural, and
restorative justice, provided in some forms by the TRC - are offered to
victims.28 Cose also says of his own impressionistic and moving study
of victims of crime, political violence, and injustice, “I have repeatedly
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found myself amazed at the capacity of and willingness of otherwise
ordinary human beings to return injury with compassion.”29
It is true that victims of violence sometimes crave vengeance. It
is true that many victims desire and expect that wrongdoers will be
made to “pay” through socially organized retributive responses.30 Yet,
a substantial body of evidence, some controlled and some anecdotal or
historical, shows that many victims seek forms of satisfaction,
vindication, or resolution that are not vengeful even where they are
retributive, or that are not only or necessarily retributive. Victims
seeking retribution are willing to see an impersonal, measured, and
socially sanctioned act of retribution as appropriate vindication in part
because it represents a public and communally shared response rather
than a private act of reprisal. Furthermore, retributive responses are
not the only way to achieve a public and socially shared vindication.
Victims do not typically seek, it seems, to visit back on their offenders
what they have suffered themselves. For many victims of violence, this
is more than an emotional fact; it is a moral position. In a stark
statement of this position, Susan Brison, a survivor of sexual violence
and attempted murder, says, “I have seen the face of a killer set on
exterminating a fellow human being. It is not a face I want to see
when I look in the mirror.”31 Pumla Gobodo-Madikezela, a psychologist
on the staff of the South African TRC, goes so far as to speak of the
victim’s resolve that “I cannot and will not return the evil you inflicted
on me” not only as “the victim’s triumph,” but as “a kind of revenge.”32
Yet the victim who forswears violent retaliation does not do so to inflict
suffering on her wrongdoer, but to assert her own power to define
herself as a worthy person, and as one who is not controlled or
entrapped in reactive feelings propelled by another person’s deplorable
behavior.
It seems that victims of violence and wrongdoing have more
complex needs and desires than the portrait of the enraged avenger
can encompass. Many of these needs and desires have less to do with
what the victim can do to the offender than what the victim wants the
offender to do for him (explain, accept responsibility, show sorrow or
shame, apologize, make amends), or what the victim wants to be able
to do for herself (regain self-respect or moral equilibrium, or to trust,
or to forgive). Martha Minow, who herself often refers to the potential
cycle of violence, notes that in political contexts “Survivors differ
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remarkably in their desires for revenge, for granting forgiveness, for
remembering, and for moving on.”33 This is not surprising if we look
more closely at the complexity of emotional reactions in play for those
who suffer serious or violent wrong.

III. What Do Victims Feel?
Jeffrie Murphy, who has written extensively on vengeance,
resentment, vindictiveness, and forgiveness, says that the “vindictive
passions” of anger, resentment, and even hatred “are often occasioned
when one has been deeply wronged by another.” He continues, “These
are the passions that often prompt acts of vengeance or revenge, but
one can have the passions without acting on them, just as one can feel
sexual lust without acting on it.”34 Murphy does not imply that all
victims are seized by the “vindictive passions” or that victims must, or
are likely to, act on these feelings. What, then, are the links between
suffering serious wrongdoing and angry feelings? Is anger the
predictable or dominant response? How should we understand the
nature of angry feelings prompted by wrongdoing? In particular, when
victims of wrongdoing feel anger, at whom is it directed, and what
forms of expression does it take?
Those involved with assisting victims know that the range of
emotions victims commonly experience includes “anger, fear, terror,
frustration, confusion, guilt, self-blame, shame, humiliation, grief, and
sorrow.”35 Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and Judith Herman in their studies of
trauma, including the trauma of criminal and political victimization,
concur. Janoff-Bulman says: “[O]ne might expect anger to be a
primary response to human-induced victimizations. Anger is not wholly
absent; many crime victims experience anger, rage, and an intense
desire for revenge. Yet this response is complicated and often
compromised by the victim’s self-questioning, which, perhaps
surprisingly, may be particularly apt to follow human-induced
victimizations.”36 Indeed, Janoff-Bulman cites research showing that
the emotional responses of those who have been wrongfully harmed
by others are more complex than are the responses of those who have
encountered natural disasters. Howard Zehr offers us a window into
this world of “the intense and contradictory feelings of victims” in his
remarkable book of interviews, Transcending, in which Zehr asks
victims of violent crime and families of those murdered to discuss their
experiences.37 The sample is hardly representative, as Zehr’s interview
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candidates were referred by victim services agencies and restorative
justice programs. But the feelings described by those interviewed
vividly illustrate the general picture given by psychologists of
victimization and trauma.
The thirty-nine victim statements include repeated references to
“anger,” “anger and frustration,” “enormous anger,” “horrible anger,”
“rage,” and “hatred.” Reported alongside the anger in many of the
interviews are also shame, grief, distrust, humiliation, depression, selfblame, shock, fear, and, in some unforgettable phrases, “shattering,
howling pain,” and “visceral, animal anguish.”38 Victims repeatedly say
“in the beginning...” when they describe what they feel; more than a
narrative convention, this signals how important to victims is the
succession and course of emotions that victims traverse in reacting to
their experience, riding out the complex synergy and interaction of
feelings, being ashamed of one’s fear, or frightened of one’s anger, or
even, in a pattern too common to be dismissed, finding that grief or
sadness over their own loss gives way to compassion for the
offender.39 Many respondents describe intensely vengeful feelings, and
only some of them repudiate those feelings; some report a
psychological passage or a moral conviction that has caused them to
overcome or leave behind vengeful feelings.40
Given this complex and multi-hued tableau of victim reactions, it
is remarkable how much philosophers and others have fixed on anger,
resentment, and indignation as the paradigmatic response to being
wronged. To be sure, there is plenty of anger in the responses of
victims. Yet, too little has been said, in discussing the moral
psychology of wrongdoing, about pain, anguish, grief, despair, fear,
mistrust, shame, and humiliation. Neglect of the importance of
“negative” emotions other than angry ones may limit our
understanding of why, how, and when victimization prompts
retaliatory violence, or does not do so. The frequency of these other
emotional responses predicts that victims will value and seek
reassurance, safety, recognition of suffering, and appropriate placing
of blame, and are likely to want this from both offenders and others,
whether or not victims desire or seek to retaliate or visit penalties on
offenders. Securing these responses from others helps victims to
restore trust and to nurture and sustain hope that their futures need
not be endlessly and pointlessly blighted by the wrongs they have
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suffered and the tormenting or exhausting feelings they now must
endure.
Since angry reactions to victimization are very common ones,
however, let us examine the ways angry reactions to wrongdoing have
been understood. It is these emotional reactions that are thought
naturally to prompt retaliatory action, or so the picture of a cycle of
vengeance or violence has it. Common to many views in a long
philosophical history is the idea that anger at wrongdoing (called either
resentment or indignation or both indifferently) usefully prompts us to
defend ourselves when we are treated ill and suffer injury, disregard,
disrespect, or insult.41 I share the view that anger at wrongdoing is
defensive. Yet, I believe we need a more capacious and complex
account of what this distinctive kind of anger tries to defend, as well as
what it is likely to dispose people to do, especially in a variety of
circumstances and in the presence of other feelings.
One fact we need to accommodate in understanding resentful
and indignant feelings is how often human beings feel this way in
response to behavior seen as simply “out of bounds,” as transgressing
any of diverse kinds of social norms where the behavior neither harms
nor appears directed at specific persons. While philosophers have
focused on cruelty, injury, insult, wickedness, injustice, or moral
offense as both the actual and proper occasions for these feelings, it is
not hard to see that resentment or indignation actually occurs very
widely, and in response to quite varied matters.42 Human beings can
and do resent not only being wrongfully harmed, cheated, or treated
with contemptuous disregard, but also behavior that simply offends a
sense of propriety or good order. People often can and do resent what
they believe is improper dress, undue familiarity, overconfidence, or
behavior or treatment out of line with someone=s apparent social role
or station; styles of dress, hair, or music they find alien or distracting;
people’s standing too close or laughing too loud; and anything else
about which there are thought to be normative boundaries, rules, or
guidelines, things “to be done” and “not to be done.”43
Resentment (and I would argue indignation as well, if these are
distinct), while by no means necessarily a moral emotion, is
necessarily a profoundly social one. It requires a sensibility that is
attuned to norms that human beings jointly create and sustain as
guides to shared life, and includes an inclination to take “personally”
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the observance and transgression of the norms assumed in play. One
takes them personally in being aroused by their violation, being ready
to insist on their recognition if not their satisfaction, and being
mobilized toward hostile, reproving, or rebuking expressions, including
in some cases punitive behavior, when the importance or authority of
norms is placed in question. Whether one is in a position to express
anger, and to rebuke or punish, however, depends on a variety of
features of context and social position, including how one stands with
respect to norm violators and to others to whom one might look to
share one’s perception and support one’s assumption of normative
authority. People who smoulder with resentment or indignation may be
afraid to express this directly to norm violators who are powerful or
feared, or may wonder “who am I to make demands or raise a fuss?”
when uncertain that others will share their perceptions or acknowledge
their standing to challenge norm violators.
A sensibility attuned to norms is a basic part of human social
functioning.44 We navigate the human world around us by forming and
acting on normative expectations of others and of ourselves. Our
normative expectations embody what we expect of people, whether or
not we expect that they are likely to behave compliantly (although in
many instances we do expect that people will behave as they are
supposed to behave). A normative expectation anticipates compliance
more or less (and sometimes scarcely at all), but always implicitly
embodies a demand for that form of behavior we think we’ve a right
to. A simple explanation of that “right,” is the presumed authority of a
norm of some kind; the expression of our sense of entitlement is our
readiness to be aroused angrily at one whose noncompliant behavior
threatens the authority of a norm we believe matters, by defying or
rejecting it.45
Resentment and indignation are this distinctive accusing and
rebuking anger. This anger does not arise only when we ourselves are
injured, nor only when the norms violated or the order threatened are
moral in nature, however one defines ‘moral’.46 Even when we
ourselves or others are injured or ill treated in morally wrongful ways,
it is not the fact of harm or suffering in itself but the sense of
wrongfulness of that harm or suffering that is embodied in these kinds
of anger; resentment and indignation in these cases predicate shared
moral rules, norms, or boundaries that define some actions as morally
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unacceptable. These angry feelings are not only upsets or frustrations
- as when one “blows up” over a persistent irritant, impediment, or
discomfort; these feelings embody imputations of responsibility and
fault assigned to other actors in virtue of their having transgressed
normative - and in the most important cases, moral - boundaries. The
essentially normative reference of these feelings explains certain of
their important features. These feelings belong to that family of
“reactive” attitudes which embody a “participant” stance toward other
people.47 In that stance, we hold others responsible for their
intentional actions, absent disqualifying or excusing circumstances,
and see ourselves in a form of relationship to others that entails
mutual accountability and the right to demand it. The occurrence of
resentment or indignation signals that behavior is found faulty; the
expression of these feelings constitutes a challenge to others and a
demand on them. Because resentment and indignation express a
finding of fault and a demand for some response it makes sense that
they are not displayed in all instances, or not always visited directly
upon the offending party. The fact that this anger accuses and rebukes
someone means that to display it toward the offending person can be
risky or is itself out of bounds in certain circumstances. Nor do these
feelings, even when overtly displayed, characteristically lead to direct
aggression against offenders, although they certainly can lead to that
in some cases.
I can resent something insulting you have said to me and take a
poke at you. But I can also say, for example, “I resent that!” or “How
dare you!” and thereby put you on notice that I have found fault with
your behavior and hold you to account with a demand for some
appropriate response. Appropriate responses from offenders include at
the very least acknowledgment of fault and responsibility (when
justification and excuse do not apply), and beyond that, some attempt
at repair, including apology or amends. My resentful and indignant
responses can also seek an audience in others who I assume will share
my judgment of faulty action and will join me in or support my
demand for an accounting. We might say, “Who do they think they
are?” or “Are we going to let them get away with that?” These
expressions verbally present the invitation to pursue an accounting
that is demanded by anger focused on normatively banned behavior.
So, one need not always or only demand this accounting directly of
offenders; one can just as well turn its demands to an audience or
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community, seeking shared or communal action. And whether
individual or shared, an action that embodies anger at unacceptable
behavior need not be violent, vengeful, or retaliatory, although it will
be in some way confrontational or demanding. There are varied ways
of pursuing a settling of accounts from offenders. Some involve doing
something unpleasant to offending parties, but others involve trying to
secure corrective responses from them. These courses of action do not
exclude each other. One may seek both to penalize and to extract
repentance or amends.
Resentment and indignation arise as responses to behavior that
contravenes normative expectations. Our central normative
expectations include expectations of others with whom we think we
are playing by rules not only to play by them, but also to rise to the
reiteration and enforcement of those rules when some go out of
bounds. Normative confirmation and enforcement is something we
usually feel we have a right to expect of each other, alongside the
behavior that specific rules require. When we express and direct our
resentment or indignation at a norm violator, we demand some
rectifying response from the one who is perceived as out of bounds;
when we express our resentment to others, we invite confirmation
from others that we have competently judged a normative violation
and that others share our interest in affirming the norms we hold, in
disapproving conduct out of bounds, and even perhaps in seeking
redress of violations. All the more so when the violation is a serious
one, a cause of harm, indignity, or insult that is apt to be seen as
moral matter.
If this analysis of the normative reference of resentment and
indignation is plausible, it makes sense of the fact that the expression
and aim of these angry feelings is not necessarily and perhaps is not
typically violent, vengeful, or retaliatory. But victims of serious
wrongdoing may indeed experience feelings of rage and frustration at
hurt or loss, and these feelings can drive one possessed by them to
lash out directly and strike back. One needs only to read victims’
accounts to hear reports of that rage and fury. Victims may also suffer
humiliation that feeds not only anger but shame. Feelings of
humiliation in particular deserve special attention, and have received it
in some studies. Humiliation, an “enforced lowering of a person or
group...that damages or strips away their pride, honor, or dignity,”
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can be a potent and volatile source of rage that may seek to satisfy
itself by achieving a kind of crushing triumph over those who have
hurt and humiliated one.48 Thomas Scheff, for example, argues that
case studies of warfare, duel, and feud illustrate that the relevant
cycle of vengeance is “insult, humiliation, and revenge,” where anger
is really a defense against shame, and “unacknowledged shame”
drives retaliation and escalation.49 Scheff sees resentment as a
“shame-anger variant,” but given the normative analysis of
resentment I have suggested, it might make better sense to see
resentment as disposing one to feeling devalued and shamed, if one’s
angry reaction to injury is not met with confirmation and support by
others, and also, perhaps, if one finds oneself feeling powerless to
demand a corrective response. Actions can be humiliating even when
they are not intended to be, but whether or not a victim of wrong
suffers humiliation in being wronged, and whether the humiliating
effect is intended by the wrongdoer or is not intended, there remains
the possibility that the victim may yet be humiliated (or humiliated yet
again) if the community or authority to whom the victim looks for
normative confirmation fails to provide that validation. If the
community or authority ignores the victim, challenges the victim=s
credibility, treats the victim’s complaint as of little import, shelters or
sides with the perpetrator of wrong, or worse, overtly or by implication
blames the victim, the victim will feel abandoned and isolated. That
abandonment is a “second injury” that can itself be humiliating.50
Finally, whether or not that second wound is humiliating, it can
precipitate anger, grief, fear, terror, or despair, the same
commonplace feelings that victims are liable to experience due to the
original injury or wrong. That is because to fail to confirm the victim’s
sense of wrong is itself another wrong that violates the trust embodied
in normative expectations, the trust that one can rely on a recognition
of the shared “rules” by which we live. This complex dynamic of rage,
resentment, indignation, and humiliation and the centrality of
normative expectations to human social life sheds light on a
phenomenon too common to be ignored. Whatever the particular
emotional reactions and needs of victims, what seems especially
painful and can feel disastrous for victims is normative abandonment.
Victims of wrongful harm often experience as much or more rage,
resentment, indignation, or humiliation in response to the failure of
other people and institutions to come to their aid, acknowledge their
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injury, reaffirm standards, place blame appropriately on wrongdoers,
and offer some forms of solace, safety, and relief, as victims
experience toward the original wrongdoer.51 It is bad enough to have
normative expectations of minimal respect and decent treatment
violated, to feel one has lost control of one’s life, or to be injured and
rendered vulnerable to a storm of painful feelings. It can be
unendurable then to be ignored, to be denied credibility, or to run up
against the fact that others, including those institutionally empowered
to deal with crime and violence, do not seem to care about one’s
experience of violation and its consequences.52
Given the need for normative confirmation, it is not surprising
that retaliatory or vengeful responses by or on behalf of victims are
not the only natural and appropriate responses to serious wrongdoing.
Neither are these responses necessarily the most satisfying or effective
ones in giving victims what they need and deserve. After decades of
work with victims and criminal offenders Howard Zehr, a founding
theorist and practitioner of restorative justice, believes that a “need
for vindication is more basic and instinctual than the need for
revenge,” and that revenge is “one among a number of ways that one
can seek vindication.”53 Vindication includes others’ confirming the
reality and the wrong of what has happened to the victim,
acknowledging the victim’s loss, anger, and suffering in its usually
complex and multiple forms, placing responsibility clearly upon the
perpetrator and other responsible parties, and joining the victim in
negative judgment, demands for accountability, and the search for
corrective responses. It may be particularly satisfying to receive this
vindication from the individual (or individuals) actually responsible for
the harm, but what is essential is to receive this confirmation and
vindication from others. What is corrosive for the victim, and it can be
disastrous, is to be isolated or abandoned in one’s injury or sense of
affront.
Vengeful retaliatory action is one way victims may seek to
achieve a sense of vindication, at least by placing responsibility on the
perpetrator and demonstrating the victim’s anger in no uncertain
terms. Socially sanctioned retribution may be preferred to private
vengeance by some because it joins the victim with others and makes
vindication a social and public fact, rather than a private satisfaction.
Yet retributive actions are not the only ones that express solidarity
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with victims, forcefully reiterate boundaries, and testify to the victim’s
dignity, blamelessness, and membership in a community. Indeed,
purely punitive actions might seem incomplete, or beside the point, for
some victims. The vindication they seek might require the perpetrator
or the community to respond to the crime and to them, rather than
primarily to make the wrongdoer suffer.
Art and science may be used to abet views that the anger of
victims naturally or inevitably desires and seeks revenge. It might
seem that the emotional appeal of revenge dramas, as old as
literature, reveals the delight human beings can take in seeing a
wrong “righted” by vengeful, and often by violent, means. The
enjoyment of the dramatic formula, though, does not mean that
vengeful comeuppance is usually sought by victims, nor that the
satisfactions of the spectator to a drama of vengeance are a
simulacrum of the enjoyment that awaits the victim who gets
vengeance. The satisfactions of vengeance are often said to be shown
by human beings’ fascination with fictional vengeance, but people are
also mesmerized and thrilled by slasher and serial killer movies,
excitement they would hardly feel were they to encounter a homicidal
maniac.54 It may be enthralling to many people to follow a plot of
perfect and conclusive repayment of ill with ill, but this enjoyment
takes place for most from the safe position of spectators who are not
for the most part coping with their own violation in the real world.
Many victim testimonies suggest that the fantasy of vengeance is at
some points powerfully satisfying for them. Even so, we have seen
that many victims neither desire nor pursue retaliation or vengeance,
and some will find even organized punishment hollow.
Little is actually known about the satisfactions of vengeance,
although some scientific research suggests that there are such
satisfactions. Some breathless headlines in the press reporting these
studies, however, turn out to be rather misleading. In “Payback Time:
Why Revenge Tastes So Sweet,” the New York Times writer Benedict
Carey reports evidence of “a biologically rooted sense of justice...that
functions in the brain something like appetite.” “Retaliation,”
“revenge,” and “punishing” are said to be functional and linked to
brain activity indicating pleasure. But it seems that in fact quite varied
vindicatory action can fulfill the “sense of justice” activated by others’
bad or nonreciprocal behavior: refusing to cooperate in a game,
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putting someone in a shaming situation of accountability, signing a
petition to protest a perceived injustice, or making a wisecrack.55 In
“Revenge: The Evidence Mounts,” game players’ brains light up in a
scan that reveals activity in a reward-processing area of the brain
when players “punished” those who didn’t reciprocate their generosity
in a money game.56 In “The Urge to Punish Cheats: It Isn’t Merely
Vengeance,” Natalie Angier reports a study that shows participants
eager to punish someone who “cheated” by not contributing fairly to a
shared project.57 Aside from a curious eagerness to use these results
in a general-interest publication to justify “vengeance” and “revenge,”
these reports generalize from contexts of cooperative play where the
“punishment” is usually refusal to make benefits available to someone
who has not reciprocated. It is not so clear what they imply for
responses to violence and serious threat, where there may be
extensive and traumatic consequences of the violence suffered, severe
differences in power and vulnerability between victims and
perpetrators, as well as awareness of exposure to real risk in taking
retaliatory (or perhaps even vindicatory) action.58 Nonetheless these
studies are suggestive when one notices the expressive dimension of
the tame maneuvers dramatically redescribed as “revenge”: human
beings find it very important, even in a game, to express disapproval,
to make known to free-riders and others who do not contribute to the
maintenance of an order that they are under the disapproving, even
angry eyes of others. These “punishments” and “retaliations,”
however, are almost entirely symbolic.
Human beings do feel pleasure, and relief, in making sure that
they let others know that they are out of bounds, and human beings
are often very sensitive to this kind of expressive correction. This is
norm confirmation and enforcement at a very rudimentary but socially
indispensable level. Confirmation and enforcement of more weighty
and forceful kinds are needed in more serious cases, but the need to
communicate forcefully that conduct is unacceptable is a constant. This
is always a part of vindication, and resentment and indignation are in
their very expression messages of disapproval that are confrontational,
demanding, and at least mildly threatening. Some vindicatory value
may be found by victims in the very display of their just anger, and in
finding that others are willing to amplify its force by adding their own
expressions of anger or outrage, and this might indeed be a source of
pleasure and relief. None of this seems to suggest, however, that
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“revenge” or “vengeance” in the usual, grander senses, are in our
circuitry or our genes.59
In sum, experts on criminal victimization, political violence, and
trauma have explored the extensive network of fractures to a person’s
basic assumptions and attitudes that occur when they encounter
violent, threatening, and profoundly disrespectful behavior at others’
hands. These fractures result in the intricate and changing patterns of
feeling to which victims of serious wrongdoing are subject. Vindication
and satisfaction will be sought by victims who are not utterly crushed
by powerlessness or despair. There are many levels and forms of
vindication, and only some may be available for, and preferred or
valued by, victims. Aside from roles played by variations of
personality, disposition, and history of victims in shaping their
attraction to or need for certain vindicatory responses, there is the
crucial issue of what forms of vindication are available and are socially
supported. One safe generalization that can be made about what
victims want and seek is that they want and seek vindication in some
form, and that abandonment and isolation in their injury is one fate
that victims deeply need to avoid and deserve to be spared.
Vindication involves confirming the fact of wrong and injury,
identifying responsible parties, and responding to the needs of victims
to recover or stabilize their sense of dignity and to receive recognition
of their loss and suffering. This much is predictable. Vengeful or
violent responses to wrongdoing are not.

IV. Opportunism or Responsibility
“Revolution! All masters, no slaves!” Graffito,
Vondelpark entrance, Amsterdam, summer 2003.
“As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master.”
Abraham Lincoln

Readers might now be impatient that I have dwelt at such
length on the variety and complexity of responses of individual victims.
After all, is not the “cycle of violence” most characteristic of rounds of
retaliation between groups inflamed by a sense of grievance and
victimization? I agree that it is, and it is precisely for this reason that I
have focused attention on the individual victim’s predictably complex
responses to victimization, especially victimization by violence. Victims
individually do crave vindication, but may not always see an opening
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to seek or demand it. There are many forms and aspects of
vindication, not all equally available or relevant to individuals in very
different circumstances. Social environments play decisive roles in
attributing lesser or greater significance to the offense any victim has
suffered, encouraging or discouraging specific interpretations of injury
and expectations of responses to injury, and opening or closing
avenues of socially supported and legitimated response for victims.
Most significant for initiating or sustaining cycles of violence and
vengeance is the socially supported idea that violence is both a
necessary and justified response to a prior wrong, and sometimes
even to a supposedly imminent one. The clearest examples of this are
cultures that formally structure a pattern of “vendetta” or “feud,” and
require members to enact vengeance on behalf of their families or
clans, or to pay the price of social disgrace. Today, perhaps, the
greater worry is a kind of “freelance” politics of vengeance that is open
to opportunistic political leaders. While victims of individual violence
and insult often find they are ignored, neglected, or blamed for what
they have suffered, there are contexts where it is politically opportune
for some who seek power to encourage others to understand their
individual losses or suffering as a shared cause for violent reprisal, or
to join in that shared cause even when they have not individually
experienced harm. Retaliatory violence by individuals is in fact
uncommon; it is very largely an orchestrated group phenomenon, and
that is the most important feature of it to focus on for moral and
political understanding. Groups can be mobilized around the elevation
of an individual injury or affront to representative status (what “they”
do to “us”), or by appeal to a history of violation or insult - real,
exaggerated, or mythologized - that has gone unredressed, and has
become a continuing humiliation that cries out for response.
Of course, there are in fact many terrible wrongs to people and
to peoples that have gone unanswered, and even unacknowledged.
But whether the offense is real and accurately represented, or whether
it is exaggerated, fantasized, or mythologized - or some of both - the
common desire of victims for normative validation provides the
switchpoint for socially shaped responses. Instead of talking about a
cycle of violence as a force of nature or a law of human psychology,
we should talk about the social reception and the political management
of resentment, outrage, humiliation, shame, defeat or despair, which
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involves both the power to frame events in ways that acknowledge or
encourage these responses, and the power to direct these responses
toward some kinds of expression and satisfaction rather than others. It
is true that many in communities who experience protracted political
violence, bombardment, siege, terrorist attacks, and persecution, in
which individuals experience the injury, death, torture, rape, or
humiliation of themselves or those around them, are likely to develop
intense hatred, rage, and vengeful feelings.60 Yet these are precisely
the circumstances of sustained group violence, and both the violence
experienced and violent responses in retaliation occur through
politically mobilized groups.
The entrenchment of the idea of a cycle of violence can actually
function, intentionally or unintentionally, as a part of the framing of
wrongs and conflicts in ways that encourage retaliatory violence. First,
and most obviously, to naturalize cycles of violence can mean
mitigating, if not legitimating, the actions of those who respond to
violence with retaliatory violence. There are also subtler possibilities.
The assumption that violence and other serious abuses of human
beings “cycles” reassures those who have in fact inflicted violence and
visited oppressive or humiliating conditions on others that we really
are all capable of this, or at least prone to it. This allows perpetrators
to evade the significance and shamefulness of what they have done by
imagining a fictive moral equivalence between perpetrators and actual
victims. The available thought is: were they able to now (or perhaps
had they been able to then), the victims would behave as brutally as
we have; we are now being demonized, hounded, stigmatized, and the
victims are opportunistically lording it over us.61 Since perpetrators of
harm to others characteristically engage in some degree of denial and
often in outright evasion, it is helpful to perpetrators to be able to level
the moral playing field with the thought that “they are no better.” In
fact, a classic study of perpetrator evasion in juvenile delinquents
remains eerily accurate in application to today’s war criminals, masters
of state terror, or participants in genocide: perpetrators predictably
and repetitively use a few utterly common lines of evasion when faced
with responsibility, and one of them is “condemning the condemners”
– “they’re crooked too,” “they were asking for it,” “they started it,”
“they would have done it to us if we hadn’t done it first.”62
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The ugly falsehood of this moral leveling is further brought
home when victims expressly decide that they will not engage in
retaliation precisely because this is to be “like them,” like the ones
who were capable of grossly harming others. The presumption that we
are all capable of similar brutality can be used by perpetrators to
distance or diminish responsibility. It can become a practical rationale
for refusing to accept responsibility or even concede fault: to do so is
to invite the inevitable bloody reprisal. Denial then appears as prudent
or reasonable self-defense against an imminent turn of the wheel of
retaliatory violence. At the same time, denial aggravates the due
resentments of those already harmed, and can ignite more resentment
or outrage in victims when the insult of denial is added to the original
injury. Anticipation of retaliatory violence may even play a role in
reasoning that it is necessary to escalate continuing violence, to insure
that there is no one left standing to deliver the inevitable payback. It’s
close kin to a way of thinking that Jonathan Glover has described as
the “Hobbesian trap,” in which opposed groups each see a reason for
striking the other first; fear of immanent attack is the tension in the
spring.63
At the same time as the picture of cycling violence allows
perpetrators to deflect responsibility or can drive them to insure
against reprisal, the same picture can pressure victims to go in the
opposite direction. If the possibilities for addressing conflict are
represented as “vengeance or forgiveness,” victims may feel, or may
actually be, pressed to take an undemanding, or even a forgiving
stance, even where this frustrates their needs for vindication or
forecloses any of the varieties of vindication that might satisfy their
needs to have their dignity restored, their suffering acknowledged, or
their losses compensated. The pursuit of vindication will involve
confronting wrongdoers with the task of taking responsibility or it will
at any rate involve seeking social support for placing responsibility
upon them; and vindication will usually require some other efforts to
satisfy victims as well. The other efforts need not, however, involve
seeking the satisfactions of retaliation or reprisal in kind or proportion.
There is always the possibility, finally, that victims may feel pressed to
forgo the vindication they need and deserve if satisfaction is
mistakenly reduced to reprisal or revenge. They might drive their own
resentment and right to satisfaction underground, adding the
humiliation of knuckling under without vindication to demands that
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they not irresponsibly make demands for justice that could trigger the
cycle of violence.64 This is a prescription for frustration or unresolved
anger, and either of these might later be mobilized politically in a
quest to settle old scores. The century past has seen waves of
“humiliation entrepreneurship” where the violence and indignity of past
warfare and colonialism are deliberately recycled, leading to mass
violence and genocide.65
It is unimaginable, given the amount of violence there already is
in the world, provoked and unprovoked, how much worse the world
would be if in fact human beings were spontaneously and routinely
prompted to counter-violence. Very often they are not. We do well to
evade the dramatic pull of the image of the cycle of violence as a
spontaneous, natural, or inevitable phenomenon. It misrepresents
both the emotional realities of victims’ complex responses to violence
and the importance of communal support and recognition of victims’
needs and rights. It is to the politics of vengeance and the politics of
peacemaking that we should look in understanding and avoiding cycles
of violent and vengeful retaliation. It is the social reception and the
political management of resentment, outrage, humiliation, shame,
defeat or despair in the wake of violence that will repay very careful
study.66
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